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Abstract
This paper is a first step toward a more fundamental theory of political economy
outcomes. We start from the fundamentals of the economy, given by preferences
and technology; further, we specify all available technologies for the control of
resources — such as armed forces or bribing. We model the interaction of agents
in this economy as a game and examine all its equilibria. Equilibrium allocations
must be such that individuals maximize their utility and that no group of indi-
viduals has the incentive to modify those allocations by (additional) usage of the
technologies for the control of resources. The generality of our approach enables
us to answer the question “Is there something about the nature of a country that
makes inefficient equilibria inevitable?” We illustrate our approach by applying it
to the natural resource curse. The model predicts that inefficient outcomes — in
the form of either conflict or a deterrence army solution — will always occur as
long as the value of natural resources to capture is positive and the opportunity
cost of time — which partly determines soldiers’ wages — is finite.
JEL Codes: H11, O11, P16.
Keywords: Endogenous political economy, conflict, deterrence, natural resource
curse, inefficiency, general equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long sought reasons to explain the striking cross-country differences in
standards of living. Success in economic development has enormous implication in terms
of literacy, longevity, access to adequate health care and many other dimensions that are
of first importance for the quality of life. A sustained difference of only a few percentage
points in the growth rate of GDP pc separates a gruesome and grim existence from the
everyday life experience of people in developed economies. The quest to understand
the key to economic development was perhaps best summarized in Bob Lucas’ much
celebrated quote:
Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead
the Indian government to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what ex-
actly? If not, what is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so? The
consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply
staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about
anything else. Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1988)
Cross-country differences in GDP pc growth rates are positively correlated with in-
dicators of aggregate governance. In fact, institutional differences across countries are
seen as an important part of the explanation of the heterogeneity of growth experiences.
In this paper, we seek an explanation for why inefficient institutions emerge and persist,
institutions that prevent a more efficient allocation of resources to prevail. Rephrasing
Lucas’ quest, we aim to uncover the elements in the “nature” of a country that lead
to inefficient resource allocation as is the case for example in the presence of armed
conflict, or of a deterrence army that secures control of resources to the benefit of a few,
or when bureaucrats manage to extract large rents from other members of society. We
believe that these inefficient political economy outcomes or institutions are equilibria of
an underlying economic problem that we seek to uncover. We do so by proposing a more
fundamental theory of political economy outcomes, as follows.
We start from the fundamentals of the economy, given by preferences and technology;
further, we specify all available technologies for the control of resources — such as armed
forces or bribing. We model the interaction of agents in this economy as a game and
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examine all its equilibria. Equilibrium allocations must be such that individuals max-
imize their utility and that no group of individuals has the incentive to modify those
allocations by (additional) usage of the technologies for the control of resources. The
generality of our approach enables us to answer the question “Is there something about
the nature of a country that makes inefficient equilibria inevitable?” We illustrate our
approach by applying it to the natural resource curse. The model predicts that ineffi-
cient outcomes — in the form of either conflict or a deterrence army solution — will always
occur as long as the value of natural resources to capture is positive and the opportunity
cost of time — which partly determines soldiers’ wages — is finite.1
The fact that all equilibria of this game are inefficient is what allows us to conclude
that inefficiency is inevitable. Even if one dictator were brought down, the analysis shows
that because of the “nature” of the economy — manifested in a high stream of exogenous
income and a low opportunity cost of time from other activities — a new dictatorship
would emerge or else be replaced by the fighting of rival groups for the control of the
income associated with natural resources. As long as there is income to appropriate and
the opportunity cost of time is low, there is no hope for efficiency in our model economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we lay out in greater detail what
we perceive as a new approach to political economy outcomes. In section 3, we apply
this approach to an economy rich in natural resources.
2 A More Fundamental Theory of Political Econ-
omy Outcomes
The literature on political economy is extremely vast, as documented for example in
Allen Drazen’s (2000) and Persson and Tabellini’s (2000) recent books. In his discussion
of these two volumes, Gilles Saint-Paul (2000) argues that the contributions of the past
fifteen years in this field have two main features: first, the literature aims at explaining
actual economic policies instead of taking them as given; second, it crucially recognizes
1We are of course aware that, in reality, some countries have been able to fight off the curse and
explore the wealth from natural resource without experiencing armed conflict or the presence of a
dictator. In section 3.8, we discuss issues such as financial constraints and different specifications of
preferences that would modify our results. Nonetheless, the stark environment presented below — devoid
of financial constraints and other frictions — appears as a very natural starting point against which other
settings can be compared.
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that policies will be the outcome of a political mechanism and, consequently, will reflect
the interests of the most powerful groups in society. The literature frequently uses a set
of familiar tools, such as the median voter theorem and probabilistic voting, while draw-
ing also on agency theory, overlapping generations’ models, game theory and dynamic
general equilibrium analysis. The prolific contributions to this literature have spanned
an enormous variety of topics, ranging from the determinants of redistributive taxation,
school financing, inflation and labor market policies, to mention just a few.
Quoting Saint-Paul, the new political economy “typically generates predictions about
how policies that are actually pursued will depend on the distribution of agent’s incomes
and endowments, and political institutions.” (my italics) Consider the following example.
Start by assuming that the economic problem at hand takes place in a democratic
country where individuals have universal voting rights. Postulate a given distribution
of wealth in the economy and consider the problem of passing redistributive taxation
legislation. Naturally, rich people will oppose high taxes and poor people favor them. If
there are very few rich people, the poor will have more than 50% of the vote and will
be able to pass their preferred tax rate. If the relative size of the rich group compared
to the poor is larger, this result may be overturned. This is a simple but representative
example of the typical problems studied in the literature.
The goal of the current analysis is to question the fact that the presence of a demo-
cratic environment — or any other set of “assumed” institutions — is exogenous and, in
particular, to question its independence from the other fundamentals of the economy,
most notably the distribution of wealth. Why should a democracy prevail if there are
very rich people who would lose a lot should the poor’s preferred tax rate come to pass?
What does it mean to have a “democracy” if the rich could bribe public officials not
to collect their taxes? Could the poor bribe the same officials back into the “right be-
havior”? How would the tax men respond if there were many poor people and very few
rich people? This same line of questioning applies to other political economy outcomes,
as well. Why did dictatorships emerge in certain countries? Was it an unavoidable
outcome? Did the distribution of wealth play a role? Do the oppressed have the means
to fight the dictator? How many different groups fighting to take hold of an economy’s
natural resources should we see in equilibrium? What factors — if any — contribute to
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the emergence of a large number of opposing factions? Is there something about the
economic fundamentals of the country that makes inefficient outcomes unavoidable?
We believe that the only way to answer all these questions is to completely bypass
“political institutions,” such as democracy or the existence of universal voting rights, and
instead focus exclusively on economic outcomes as follows. The methodology proposed
here starts from the description of the fundamentals of an economy: the number of people
in the population as well as their skill type, the wealth distribution, the technology
available; and, of crucial importance, the set of technologies available for the effective
control of resources. That is, if a group of the population can hire soldiers by paying
them wages and providing guns in order to take control of the economy’s resources, the
costs and properties of the “army” technology should be specified. If it is feasible to
bribe public officials and this accomplishes the possibility of avoiding taxes with some
probability, the “bribe” technology should be specified as well. Importantly, technologies
for resource control are symmetric in that any agent or group of agents has access to
them (a different question is, of course, whether or not (s)he has the resources to use
them).
To fix ideas, consider the particular problem of the natural resource curse: a country
whose soil generates a very large amount of exogenous income, Y . Suppose that, by
choosing to work in the country’s infrastructure, individuals receive income k from their
human capital. They can also form armies by hiring soldiers and providing them with
guns. Armies serve the purpose of trying to gain control of natural resources. Military
expenditures naturally require financing, and individuals in the economy may choose to
organize themselves into coalitions so that they can finance an army, should they not
have the resources to do so on their own.
Once the economic fundamentals are fully specified, one can then trace the set of
feasible political economy equilibria and answer questions such as: Under what economic
conditions will an armed dictatorship emerge? Will there be a countervailing army try-
ing to fight the dictator or is the dictator’s army enough to dissuade the creation of a
competing army by the oppressed? Will there be multiple armed groups fighting for
control of the natural resources? Are there situations where no individual or coalition
uses resources to engage armies? Could it be the case that, under these economic funda-
4
mentals, all equilibria result in inefficient resource allocation? How does any particular
equilibrium respond to economic development — i.e. an increment in k, the human capi-
tal income that individuals may get if they choose to work? We believe that it is only by
considering the entire set of equilibria of this game that we may judge on the inevitabil-
ity of inefficient outcomes. In other words, while we often observe armed conflicts in
countries rich in natural resources, if it were the case that some equilibria resulted in
a fully efficient allocation of resources, we would not accept inefficient outcomes as un-
avoidable. Further, if efficient equilibria existed, they would also be informative about
which features of the economic environment may lead to inefficient allocations. Thus,
the analysis will provide the tools to understand what elements of the economic funda-
mentals are driving particular outcomes. It is in this sense that the analysis illustrates
the aspects of the “nature” of a country that lead to particular outcomes.
Our intuition is that “democracy” or other political institutions are the solution
and window-dressing of an economic problem which we aim to uncover. Perhaps the
most important starting point of the analysis is the notion that, contrary to most of
the literature (see Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)), the only power that is relevant to
accomplish control of resources is economic power; that having the means to engage
control technologies is the only source of (de facto) power, and that de jure power is
nothing more than the manifestation of economic power; that “democracies” will prevail
only inasmuch as it is either too uninteresting to change the control of resources or that
no single group could successfully strive to do so (because others would oppose). And
that, in this sense, what deserves examination is the final allocation of resources and how
much resources are put by which groups into its control. In fact, the political process
is a black box that need not be directly examined: the possibility of side-payments to
“correct” the outcome of, say, the voting process is all that is needed to implement the
preferred allocation from the point of view of the group with greatest economic power.
This is the “theorem” our environment has to offer, extremely dissimilar from the median
voter result.
Naturally, other researchers have questioned the exogenous emergence of “institu-
tions” in economic models. We find out contribution closer in spirit to the body of work
by H.I. Grossman. As described by Kolmar (2005), Grossman viewed institutions as the
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equilibrium of a game. That was the case for example in his 1991 piece, where a general
equilibrium model of insurrections is presented. There, the technology for insurrection
— which included, among others, parameters such as the ability of the rebel leader to
succeed — is explicitly considered and the equilibrium allocation of time devoted to in-
surrection activities, as well as soldiering and production depends on those parameters.
However, in this example, the structure of governance is assumed to consist of a leader
confronting the rest of the population; no other alternatives are considered, such as the
prevalence of simultaneous factions engaged in military conflict. Further, we do not
know what — if anything — determines the identity of the leader or whether the assumed
political organization of society into a leader and followers is the only equilibrium that
could arise given the economy’s fundamentals. We believe our approach is more general
in the important dimension that it starts one step below and considers instead all the
possible institutional configurations that could emerge given the economic fundamen-
tals. It is only through the knowledge of all political economy possibilities that we may
ascertain the robustness of given institutions across equilibria.
We believe our approach has uses for other areas of economic theory beyond what
is usually labeled as political economy. We find it particularly amenable to the study
of frictions limiting free entry in sectors or the free exertion of economic activity. For
example, Caselli and Gennaioli (2006) study the implications of different types of reforms
meant to restore access to particular sectors of activity, an access limited by inefficient
institutions. The analysis proposed here asks the more fundamental questions of why
access to sectorial activity was limited, to begin with. Only after understanding why
such an outcome emerged in equilibrium are we able to understand the tools necessary
to change it. Likewise, in Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2006), the persistence of
inefficient institutions — in the form of a corrupt body of bureaucrats — is analyzed. A
key element in the analysis is the transition to democracy in a future period, a transition
which is assumed to take place for sure but whose foundations are unrelated to the
economic fundamentals of the economy. It is by understanding the reasons that led to
the authoritarian regime in the first place that we may also understand the conditions
that might lead to a change in the political economy equilibrium — for example toward
“democracy.”
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We see the methodological approach described above (description of the fundamentals
and technologies of control to study the strategic interactions underlying all feasible
political economy outcomes) as one contribution of this paper. Our second contribution
is to apply this methodology to the natural resources problem, which we pursue below.
3 A Model of the Natural Resource Rich Economy
There is a population of size N . Each period, there is a resource flow of Y . This
is exogenous income associated with natural resources. Other income sources are as
follows. There is a stock of public capital K which measures infrastructure quality in
the country. This infrastructure gives a lower bound on the income that individuals
may get. For simplicity, we ignore endogenous labor supply and instead assume that,
if an individual decides to work, we will get k units of the consumption good. Income
k cannot be taken away from any individual, it is associated with a person’s human
capital.
There is only one good in the economy, and both the resource flow Y and individual
production k are measured in the same units. We expect Y to be large compared to k,
so that individuals have a strong incentive to try to get hold of Y . We consider later
what happens as k grows large, which we interpret as the process of development.
Utility is identical across individuals and linear in consumption:2
u (c) = c.
Technologies for control of resources are functions f ∈ F . We consider one, only, the
building of an army. Armies require people and guns. Consider coalition i. Its army
engages Si soldiers and Ki guns. The output of the army is given by Ai = f (Si, Ki),
where f (·) is Leontieff:
Ai = min {Si, Ki} .
A gun uses g units of the consumption good. Because of the Leontieff technology, it
follows that, optimally,
Si = Ki = Ai.
2Linearity was not our preferred functional form for reasons discussed below. We maintain linear
utility for analytical tractability.
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The probability of securing control of natural resources p is a function of the relative
size of the existing armies, as follows. Let n denote the number of armies in the economy,
Ai stand for the army size of coalition i, and {Aj}nj=1 be the list of army sizes in the
economy. Then,
pi ≡ p
³
Ai; {Aj}nj=1
´
=
AiP
j Aj
, p ∈ [0, 1] .
One important feature of this function is symmetry: armies of identical size have the
same probability of getting control of Y . Further, probability pi is increasing in the size
of army i and decreasing in the size of the sum of the remaining armed forces. (This
already hints at the fact that the optimal choice of army size will depend only on the
sum of existing armies and not on their relative sizes.) Probability pi is also concave in
Ai.
A soldier of army Ai who gets wage payment wi has expected utility of piwi. The
outcome in case of army defeat is thus normalized to zero.3
Timing This is an extensive game with a finite horizon. In the first stage, people
choose whether they wish to join a coalition (organization). In stage 2, coalitions form
armies by making wage offers to other people in the population who have not joined a
coalition. Members of a coalition work and collect income k which they use to pay for
guns and salaries. In the third stage, fighting occurs (provided there is more than one
army), and payoffs are realized.
Equilibrium Equilibria in our economy will be subgame perfect Nash-equilibria of the
dynamic game described above.4
3.1 Peaceful Outcome
When no armed forces are engaged, individual consumption equals:
c∗ =
Y
N
+ k. (1)
That is, each individual’s consumption would equal the sum of income from human
capital plus an equal share of the natural resource income. If the peaceful outcome
3Our results would go through as long as the utility outcome under battle loss were less than in the
case of military success, wi, perhaps due to injury in battle.
4We will also examine the refinement of coalition-proof Nash-equilibria.
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were to prevail, everybody would enjoy consumption level c∗ and no resources would be
wasted on conflict. As we will see below, peace is not an equilibrium of the game.
3.2 Armed Conflict
We proceed to analyze the equilibria of the game by backward induction.
Stage 3 At the last stage of the game, if more than one army has been hired, there
is fighting over Y and payoffs follow. If only one army has been engaged, there is no
fighting and the existing army takes control of Y . If no army has been engaged, proceeds
of y ≡ Y/N are given to each agent.
Stage 2 At stage 2, individuals who did not get matched with others in coalitions may
receive wage offers from coalitions formed in stage 1. They have the option of accepting
and working as soldiers, or rejecting. If they reject, they will receive income k from their
human capital at stage 3; further, if no coalitions formed in stage 1, they would also
receive the additional per capita income from natural resources in stage 3. If not made
a wage offer, an individual simply works and receives k in the following period, possibly
added of y in case the peaceful outcome occurs.
Expected utility of soldiers fighting for coalition i is piwi. We assume that there
are more individuals unattached to coalitions than wage offers. Thus, there will be a
group of people not engaged in fighting and, moreover, would-be soldiers do not have
bargaining power over coalitions.
What would be the wage offer that coalitions would have to make soldiers in order
for them to accept fighting? If other soldiers accept fighting, this implies that only the
coalition getting hold of Y will benefit from natural resources. The opportunity cost of
fighting is then income k, with a certainly equivalent of k/pi. Whether or not offering
wi = k/pi is enough to induce soldiers to fight depends on what a particular soldier
thinks other individuals will do. If any other soldier accepts, then it is better to accept
any wage of at least k/pi, since fighting will prevent all individuals but winning coalition
members to have access to natural resource income. If individuals in the population
are atomistic, more likely if N is very large, they will ignore the impact of their actions
on the possibility of combat. This rules out a situation where all individuals receiving
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wage offers decline those offers, effectively preventing the fighting from taking place:
individual recipients of wage offers simply do not perceive their impact on the likelihood
of war.
Alternatively, coalitions could offerwi = (k + y) /pi, effectively compensating soldiers
for the loss of natural resource income in addition to the human capital component. This
wage offer is equivalent to the no-war alternative and would thus be accepted irrespective
of what other wage-offer recipients choose to do. This higher wage rate again rules out
an equilibrium where all individuals not matched in coalitions would refuse to fight.
Under the atomistic assumption, the lower wage k/pi would suffice to eliminate the
peace outcome as well. In what follows, and without loss of generality, we assume
that coalitions offer k/pi to their soldiers and that they accept such an offer. All the
result would be qualitatively unchanged if the wage rate equaled instead (k + y) /pi.5
Therefore, in stage 2, if wage offers are made, they will always be accepted. As we will
see below, wage offers are always made in equilibrium, ruling out the possibility of peace
as an equilibrium outcome.
Consider now existing coalition i, formed ofNi members who have engagedAi soldiers
and bought Ai guns. Say this coalition pays wi to its soldiers.6 Then, the total resource
cost to the coalition from engaging an army equals
Ci = gAi + wiAi = (g + wi)Ai. (2)
The objective of the coalition is to maximize the expected benefits of its members, net of
operational and financial costs. We assume that membership is the least expensive form
of financing and so coalitions take on members as the means to finance their military
operations. The opportunity cost of funds is normalized to zero, allowing us to disregard
financial costs in the coalition’s objective function. Say that coalition i has Ni members.
Given linear utility, it is optimal to treat all members symmetrically and we thus assume
that members’ contributions to the coalition are identical. Then, expected profits per
coalition member equal
πi
Ni
=
piY − Ci
Ni
.
5This can be easily verified by replacing wage k/pi with k̃/pi, with k̃ = k + y, below.
6We assume that the entirety of the wage is paid upfront to soldiers. Results would remain qualita-
tively unchanged if only a fraction δ > 0 were paid upfront and the remaining (1− δ)wi of the soldier’s
compensation were paid in case of victory.
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Since each member has income of k, a number C∗i /k of members is necessary to finance
C∗i . Replacing this in the expression for πi we get:
πi
Ni
=
piY − Ci
Ci
k
= k
µ
piY
Ci
− 1
¶
. (3)
Lemma 1 below shows that maximizing profit per member, as in (3), yields the same
result as maximizing the absolute value of the coalition’s profits.
Lemma 1 Let a and b be two functions mapping the positive real numbers onto them-
selves.
a, b : R+ → R+.
Then,
argmax (a− b) = argmax a
b
.
That is, if we maximize the difference a− b, we also find the max of the ratio a/b.
Proof. The proof is graphical. Plot a− b against a/b for values of a/b ∈ (0,∞). This
ensures that both a and b have the same sign which, given that the functions a and b have
positive images, will be positive as well. The difference a−b is a monotonically increasing
function of the ratio a/b. Thus, there is a one-to-one relationship between values of
the difference and values of the ratio, and this relationship monotonically increasing.
Therefore, if we find the argmax of the difference a− b, we will also find the argmax of
the ratio.
Lemma 1 is useful because it allows us to maximize the absolute value of the coali-
tion’s profits (equal to benefits minus costs) instead of maximizing the ration of benefits
to costs. Define a ≡ piY and b ≡ Ci and apply Lemma 1.
3.2.1 The Problem of the Coalition
Consider coalition i, facing armed forces A−j ≡
P
j 6=iAj. Its problem is to:
max
Ai,wi
πi =
µ
Ai
Ai +A−j
Y − Ci
¶
(4)
s.to:
Ci = (g + wi)Ai (5)
piwi ≥ k. (6)
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Constraint (6) is the participation constraint of soldiers: it ensures that their expected
utility matches at least the outside alternative of working and collecting k. We will
assume that there are always strictly more people in the economy than the sum of
soldiers engaged by coalitions plus coalition members. This implies that equation (6)
is always satisfied with equality as soldiers lack bargaining power to command a higher
wage.
Replacing the constraints in the objective function, we get:
Ai
Ai +A−j
Y −
Ã
g +
k
Ai
Ai+A−j
!
Ai =
Ai
Ai +A−j
Y − (g + k)Ai − kA−j.
The first-order condition with respect to own army size Ai is:
A−j
(Ai +A−j)
2Y − (g + k) = 0
which, solving for Ai, yields:
Ai =
s
Y
g + k
A−j −A−j. (7)
3.3 Symmetric n-Coalition Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium with n coalitions with equal army size, A, we have Ai = A
and A−j = (n− 1)A.7 The probability of success in battle is then:
p =
A
nA
=
1
n
.
Using (7) to solve for A∗ we get:
A =
n− 1
n2
Y
g + k
. (8)
Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, and taking n as given,
A∗ = A∗
µ
+
Y ,
−
g,
−
k,
−
n
¶
,
where the derivative with respect to n assumes there will be more than two coalitions
(which will always be the case as shown below). Intuitively, the higher the prize Y to
7Since each coalition engages one army, we will sometimes use the terms coalition and army inter-
changeably, in particular when referring to the number of armies.
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be attained the greater the coalition size, whereas the greater the gun and wage costs
of the coalition, g and k, as well as the reciprocal of the probability of success, n, the
lower its optimal size.
Concerning the costs,
Ci = (g + wi)Ai
= (g + kn)Ai.
For a fixed coalition size Ai, total cost is increasing in the relative price of guns and on
kn — since this is the wage rate that leaves soldiers indifferent between fighting or not.
Since higher k and g reduce optimal coalition size, it is not immediately clear what their
total effect on Ci is. Inserting the optimal coalition size found above into the expression
for the cost:
Ci = (g + kn)
n− 1
n2
Y
g + k
=
g + kn
g + k
n− 1
n2
Y.
Since n exceeds unity (see below), it follows that higher k and lower g raise Ci, holding
n constant. The effect of n is ambiguous. The effect of Y is unambiguously positive
since it raises coalition size. Thus,
Ci = Ci
µ
+
k,
−
g,
+
Y , n
¶
.
Note that n is being held fixed, for the time being, and n determines the probability
of success in a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, when g increases, optimal coalition
size Ai declines (still with constant n), and the total effect on the cost is favorable: Ci
declines as well. This is partly the consequence of the Leontieff technology specified for
the army operations: the reduction in army size Ai caused by higher gun costs leads
to a parallel reduction in the number of soldiers hired and corresponding reduction in
the wage bill; the latter effect more than offsets the higher gun cost. Lower Ci will
induce entry of more coalitions in equilibrium, as shown below, since, in equilibrium,
costs must equal expected return pY = Y/n. When k increases, on the other hand,
despite the reduction in coalition size for constant n, costs nonetheless increase. Thus,
there must be exit of coalitions in equilibrium for the conflict becomes less profitable.
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This intuition on the effects of k and g on the equilibrium number of coalitions n∗
can be formally demonstrated as follows. Expected profits of the coalition are:
Eπ = pY − C = Y kn (2− n) + g
n2 (g + k)
.
It follows that:
π = π
µ
−
n,
+
g,
−
k,
+
Y
¶
.
Since the opportunity cost of capital has been normalized to zero, coalition members
will accept to finance the coalition as long as expected profits are positive. Free entry
of coalitions will drive expected profits to zero. Solving for the equilibrium n, we get:
Eπ = 0 =⇒ n = 1±
r
1 +
g
k
.
The positive root must be selected for n to take on a positive value. Finally, the equi-
librium value of n is
n∗ = 1 +
r
1 +
g
k
. (9)
We have that, as anticipated, n∗ depends positively on g and negatively on k. Inter-
estingly, n∗ exceeds unity. Further, a higher price of guns leads to an increase in the
equilibrium number of coalitions, but, if we consider the expression for A∗ in (8), we see
that the size of each coalition is getting smaller and smaller (both the direct effect of g
on A∗ and the indirect effect through n∗ lead to a smaller army size).
The effect of higher k on A∗ appears ambiguous. Holding n fixed, it reduces coalition
size, but it also reduces n, which raises coalition size. Substituting (9) in (8), we get:
A∗ =
1³
1 +
q
1
k
(g + k)
´2 Yp
k (g + k)
.
Some algebra shows that the following inequality is a sufficient condition for the denom-
inator to be an increasing function of k:
2k > g. (10)
Finally, we get:
A∗ = A∗
µ
+
Y ,
−
g,
−
k
¶
,
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where the negative sign on k is conditional on (10) holding.
An implication of our results for n∗ and A∗ under symmetric equilibria is that the
number of coalitions forming is always strictly positive, as is the amount they spend on
wasteful activities. Finally, we define Ã as the total armed forces under a symmetric
equilibrium, Ã ≡ nAi. From the zero profit condition, it follows that
nCi = Y ⇐⇒ n (g + kn)Ai = Y ⇐⇒ Ai =
Y
n (g + kn)
.
Thus, total armed forces Ã are given by:
Ã =
Y
g + kn
.
We now consider what happens as k → ∞, which we interpret as the process of
development.
lim
k→∞
n∗ = lim
k→∞
1 +
r
1 +
g
k
= 2.
lim
k→∞
Ai = lim
k→∞
n− 1
n2
Y
g + k
=
1
4
lim
k→∞
Y
g + k
= 0.
lim
k→∞
Ã = lim
k→∞
nAn = 0.
We have two rather remarkable results as k → ∞. First, the number of coalitions
converges to 2, and many developed countries are polarized around two large political
parties. Second, army size goes to zero: as k increases, the number of coalitions drops to
2 and they spend less and less. As a consequence, the total armed forces in the economy
also vanish. Thus, as the process of development ensues, spending on wasteful control
activities goes to zero.
Regarding the effects of g,
lim
g→∞
n∗ =∞
lim
g→∞
Ai = 0.
lim
g→∞
Ã = lim
g→∞
nAi = lim
g→∞
n
µ
n− 1
n2
Y
g + k
¶
= lim
g→∞
Y
g + k
= 0.
As the relative price of guns increases, more coalitions form but their size becomes
arbitrarily small, and the latter effect dominates on the size of total armed forces, which
also goes to zero.
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Stage 1 The financing of each coalition is made by the engagement ofN∗c ≡ A∗
³
g + k
p∗
´
/k
members. Thus, n∗N∗c individuals choose to join coalitions of size N
∗
c in the first stage.
The remaining N − n∗N∗c individuals in the population choose not to become coalition
members. In the second stage, a total of n∗A∗ wage offers are made and accepted. The
remaining N−n∗ (N∗c +A∗) individuals simply work and receive k. The strategy of each
individual is optimal given what others are doing at each stage and the backward in-
duction method used to solve for the equilibrium ensures subgame perfection. We note
that, although we can characterize equilibria in terms of optimal coalition and army
sizes, as well as the number of coalitions, the model is silent concerning the allocation
of particular individuals to specific groups. That is, we have multiple equilibria in the
sense that one particular person might be a coalition member in one equilibrium and a
soldier in another. But up to the identity of the players, the symmetric equilibrium is
unique. (We will come back to the identity issue in section 3.8.)
This summarizes the characterization of symmetric subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria
of our game.
3.4 Deterrence
In this section, we examine whether or not there is a deterrence equilibrium in our
economy. In such an equilibrium, one coalition would engage an army just large enough
so that other coalitions would have no incentive to form. To understand how to find the
deterrence army size, we must consider the objective function of coalition i, to
max
Ai
½
Ai
Ai +A−j
Y − (g + k)Ai − kA−j
¾
.
Graphically, profits are the difference between two schedules. The first, piY , measures
expected revenues, has origin at Ai = 0, is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The
second, the straight line (g + k)Ai + kA−j, has an intercept at kA−j and a constant
slope of (g + k). Optimality requires A∗i to be such that the slope of piY equal g + k.
Although necessary, this is not a sufficient condition for coalitions to form. In fact, if
the cost schedule is everywhere above the benefits — more likely if A−j is very large
— coalition i will have negative expected profits and should not operate. Coalition i
will behave optimally and have zero profits provided the cost schedule is tangent to the
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benefit function and Ai is given by that single intersection point. If there is a level of
A−j that accomplishes this, that level will be enough to keep coalition i out: since the
best it could do would be to form to have zero profits, it might as well stay out. More
generally, this also shows that, if A−j is low enough for additional coalitions to enter,
these entrants will need to attain a certain minimum scale in order to be profitable,
given by the (lowest) intersection of the pY schedule and the cost line (g + k)Ai+kA−j.
For clarity, let us consider also what would happen if A−j exceeded the level previ-
ously defined, that exactly leaves any entering coalition with zero profits. Higher A−j
raises the intercept of the cost schedule and moves it parallelly upward. Further, higher
A−j reduces pi and thus causes the benefit schedule to move downward, still with inter-
cept at the origin. Thus, the benefit and cost schedules would not longer be tangent,
the cost schedule would be everywhere above the benefit schedule and coalition i would
have negative profits if it chose to enter. Therefore, selecting A−j so that coalition i’s
cost and benefit schedules are tangent is the best that a dictator wanting to implement
deterrence can do.
Let Adet be the smallest army size that will implement deterrence. Then, it must be
the case that the resulting A∗i is given by the first-order condition of coalition i and, at
the same, time, its profits are zero. This is true when
Ai =
s
Y
g + k
Adet −Adet
and
Ai
Ai +Adet
Y − (g + k)Ai − kAdet = 0
both hold. Solving for Adet we get:
Adet =
gY + 2kY ± 2
q
Y 2k2
¡
1 + g
k
¢
g2
.
It can be shown that the higher root is such that the implied A∗i is negative. The solution
is thus:
Adet =
gY + 2kY − 2
q
Y 2k2
¡
1 + g
k
¢
g2
. (11)
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We may compute Adet alternatively as follows. Recall that the condition for deter-
rence is that a potential entrant, once setting Ai to its optimal size, has expected utility
of exactly zero. For this reason, the coalition does not form. Note also that, in the
first-order condition for army size, the armed forces of other coalitions show as a sum
and the individual parcels do not have any effect beyond that sum. Thus, the deter-
rence army size will equal the total armed forces of (n− 1) coalitions in the symmetric
equilibrium. At this level, the nth coalition is indifferent between forming or not because
its profits would be zero in both cases. The fact that the deterrence coalition is able
to stave off a competing army whose size would have equaled that of a single coalition
in the symmetric equilibrium is of course beneficial for those sponsoring the deterrence
army: the deterrence coalition has strictly positive profits. Therefore:
Adet =
n− 1
n
Ã =
n− 1
n
Y
g + nk
=
p
1 + g
k
1 +
p
1 + g
k
Y
g +
¡
1 +
p
1 + g
k
¢
k
.
We have then:
Adet < Ã.
Regarding the effect of development and the price of guns on deterrence, we have:
lim
k→∞
Adet = 0
lim
g→∞
Adet = lim
g→∞
1
1√
1+ g
k
+ 1
Y
g +
¡
1 +
p
1 + g
k
¢
k
= 0.
Thus, the property that development (growing k) eliminates inefficient use of resources
is common across equilibria of the game, be it under the conflict of multiple armies or
under the deterrence solution. A higher gun price also leads to a reduction in the army
size of the deterrence army.
In the deterrence equilibrium, a total of N∗det ≡ Adet (g + k) /k individuals choose to
join a coalition of N∗det size. The remaining individuals choose not to join a coalition.
In the second stage, Adet wage offers of k are made and accepted. The remaining
N −N∗det − Adet individuals do not fight and simply work to get k. All individuals are
acting optimally given what others are doing and backward induction ensures subgame
perfection. Thus, deterrence is another subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium of our game.
As in the symmetric-equilibrium case, the deterrence equilibrium is unique up to the
identity of the players.
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3.5 Asymmetric Coalition Size
Could coalitions of different sizes coexist? If this were to happen, larger coalitions
would have higher equilibrium profits than smaller ones. We show that, in the current
environment without frictions, it is not possible to have coalitions of different sizes.
Therefore, equilibria in our model will be of two types: symmetric n-coalition equilibrium
or of the deterrence type.
Proposition 2 There are no coalitions of different size in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there are coalitions of different sizes. Let two of
the coalitions in this equilibrium have sizes Ai and Aj, let Ã indicate the total number
of armed forces in the equilibrium (the sum across all coalitions), and, without loss of
generality, let coalition i be larger than coalition j. If both Ai and Aj have the optimal
size given Ã, then both Ai and Aj have to satisfy the first-order condition (7). Define
θi ≡ Ai/Ã and θj similarly, with θi > θj. We may now rewrite (7) as:
Ai = θiÃ =
s
Y (1− θi) Ã
g + k
− (1− θi) Ã ⇐⇒
Ã =
s
Y (1− θi) Ã
g + k
=⇒ Ã = Y (1− θi)
g + k
.
Similarly, for Aj,
Aj = θjÃ =
s
Y (1− θj) Ã
g + k
− (1− θj) Ã =⇒
Ã =
Y (1− θj)
g + k
.
From the assumption that coalition i is greater than j, it follows that
Y (1− θj)
g + k
>
Y (1− θi)
g + k
,
and so we get two different solutions for Ã, a contradiction.
3.6 Equilibrium Concept and Refinements
The game played by agents in our economy has two subgame perfect Nash-equilibria.8
Given that, in our environment, we examine the endogenous formation of groups, it seems
8We ignore here the multiplicity of equilibria coming from changes in the identity of players.
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natural to raise the standard of the equilibrium concept by asking if the actions we have
assigned to these groups are optimal to all the group’s members or if, instead, they could
do better by choosing to reorganize themselves into smaller or larger groups. We next
examine whether the Nash-equilibria we found are also coalition-proof equilibria, a la
Bernheim and Peleg (1987).
Coalition-proof equilibria is a refinement of Nash-equilibria applying to situations
where players can communicate before the game and coordinate their strategies. It
refines the Nash concept by imposing that, through the combined choice of action, a
group of agents will not have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium play, taking
as given the actions of the remaining players. Further, if deviant groups exist, the
candidate deviation must be coalition-proof so that none of the deviant members of the
original group wish to further deviate from the original deviation.9
We begin by applying the coalition-proof concept to the coalitions in our model. We
have found optimal coalition size taking as given the armed forces of other coalitions.
Clearly, in the symmetric equilibrium case, it would not be optimal for coalition members
to break from their original coalition and form new ones. The reason is that they would
start out with a larger number of opponents A−i, and thus have access to lower profit
opportunities than when acting within their original group. (Higher A−i lowers the
expected revenue schedule piY and raises the cost schedule kA−i+(g + k)Ai.) Further,
we have shown earlier that absolute profit optimization also yields the highest value of
profit per coalition member, and so that there is no benefit from deviating and having a
smaller size. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is robust to a downsizing of the original
coalition group size.
There is, however, a way to improve the utility of at least some of the n∗N∗c agents
engaged in sponsoring coalitions. They could agree to join forces into a single-coalition
and pursue the deterrence strategy. Thus, a subset of size N∗det — strictly smaller than
n∗N∗c — of the n
∗N∗c individuals who were sponsoring the n
∗ coalitions would get together
and instead form a single coalition which would follow the continuation strategy of the
9Deviations by a group of agents from the equilibrium strategy are checked against further deviations
but only by members of the original deviant group. That is, agents who deviated jointly in a first stage
cannot proceed to additional deviations with players who were following the strategy prescribed by
equilibrium.
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deterrence coalition (make Adet wage offers, and so on). The remaining n∗N∗c − N∗det
would not contribute to the coalition anymore and have expected income of k, just as
they did when sponsoring the coalition (since free entry of coalitions brought profits to
zero). The latter group would be indifferent between this deviation and the symmetric
equilibrium outcome, whereas those individuals sponsoring the deterrence army would
be strictly better off. Would there be additional deviations? It can be shown that there
is no gain from further reductions in coalition size. If a subgroup of the N∗det decided
to split from the original coalition, it can be shown that, irrespective of the size of the
remaining group, its expected profits would decline. Further, no other group of players
could gain by deviating and coordinating their strategy. This establishes the deterrence
solution as coalition-proof.10 This discussion informally establishes the following result:
Proposition 3 The deterrence equilibrium is the unique coalition proof, subgame perfect
Nash-equilibrium in our economy.
Should we focus attention on the deterrence outcome alone and ignore the symmet-
ric case? The identity of coalition members in reality is likely to be determined by
things outside the model. (See, in particular, the discussion on financial constraints be-
low.) Discarding the symmetric equilibria would be tantamount to considering only the
monopoly outcome — as opposed to a cartel equilibrium — when analyzing the competi-
tive structure of a given market, for example. While we find coalition-proof an insightful
refinement of Nash-equilibria, we also see the Nash concept as potentially very illumi-
nating for the strategic aspects of our game.
3.7 The Cost of Conflict
What is the resource cost of conflict? From the zero-profit/free-entry condition for
coalitions, it follows that:
pY − Ci = 0 ⇐⇒
Y
n
= Ci ⇐⇒ nCi = Y.
10Both Nash-equilibria found are coalition-proof with regard to other possible ‘group’ deviations in
the economy, where the groups are general and entail any combination of individuals.
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Thus, the total resource cost of conflict equals Y under the symmetric equilibrium case,
the income to be appropriated at the outset.
As discussed earlier, the deterrence army is smaller than the total armed forces of the
symmetric equilibrium. In addition, this coalition has the lowest wage bill per soldier,
since its soldiers will gain control of resources with probability 1. So, the deterrence
solution is more efficient than the symmetric equilibrium case. The deterrence solution’s
cost equals Adet (g + k).
3.8 Discussion
The analysis shows that there will always be inefficient military activities going on —
either in the form of multiple coalitions fighting each other or in the deterrence form —
provided k is finite and Y is positive. Since both symmetric equilibria and deterrence
are equilibria of the model, it does not give us a priori ways of knowing which one will
prevail.
The model predicts that, in equilibria with more than one coalition, coalition size
should be identical. Should this not be the case, frictions outside the model must be
operating. One likely candidate is financial frictions and/or coordination costs. In
fact, we could have framed the coalition’s problem as that of a firm maximizing its
expected profits and issuing shares to get the resources for financing its operations.
The shareholders in our economy are the coalition members who bring in their income
to finance the coalition’s army. The model assumes that the capital structure of the
coalition does not affect its operations and thus, that as many shares as required to
attain optimal army size will be issued.
Of course financial constraints are likely to be an important consideration for these
coalitions. Even if it were feasible to gather as many coalition members as needed to
pay for C∗i , the coordination costs of this endeavour would likely get out of hand: issues
of trust, of credible repayment and internal coordination would likely loom large even
under small coalition sizes. This suggest that, from an operational point of view, it is
less costly to have the smallest possible coalition. It follows that the wealthy have a
comparative advantage at setting up the coalition since they are more likely to be able
to operate with fewer additional financiers and to have fewer coordination problems.
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In fact, coalitions may not even be able to form if they would require too large
a number of financiers just to attain a profitable size (recall that, for small Ai and
large A−j, coalition i is making negative profits). In our environment, therefore, a link
between wealth inequality and the persistence of inequality emerges from the difficulty
in contesting the domain of an established deterrence force or in joining the conflict
between established big groups, for example, a difficulty which is rooted on the lack
of adequate financial means. On the contrary, if the country has a middle class with
some means, the model predicts that fighting between virtually identical coalition sizes
will likely take place, or, instead, we simply witness the deterrence solution. Of course
we have ignored the possibility of external financing. After all, if getting hold of Y is
attractive to locals, it will also be attractive to rich foreigners with means. If foreign
financing is available to all parties, the model predicts that conflicts among multiple
parties should be even.
Is there a way of avoiding the inefficient use of resources — either through conflict or
through deterrence? In other words, is there a way of approaching the efficient solution?
The reason for the conflict is the existence of Y and the fact that k is small. One issue
we seek to examine in future research is the dynamic relationship of k with conflict.
It is likely, however, that one consequence of conflict would be the worsening of the
country’s infrastructure and thus a reduction in future k. Lower k, in turn, lowers the
cost of conflict, raises army size across equilibria and the number of coalitions fighting
in the symmetric case. From this point of view, conflict today makes conflict more likely
tomorrow.
One solution would be for the countries that buy the natural resources to earmark
the income from its sales for development purposes, for example, or to require that goods
be certified not to have originated from a conflict area, the latter option resembling the
Kimberley accords for diamonds. But the new question that arises here is of course
whether this international agreement is individually rational from the point of view of
outsiders, be they rich individuals who could finance the control of Y and reap its ben-
efits, or be they rich governments of neighboring countries. If outside countries are rich
enough (in the sense of enjoying a very large k themselves and thus of having no interest
in getting hold of Y ), they may be willing to enforce this agreement. Informally, en-
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forcement of this agreement would seem to depend on the existence of a sufficiently large
group of rich countries that could credibly commit not only not to finance the capture
of Y for their own exclusive use but also to putting in place mechanisms (international
courts with adequately high punishments) that would be persuasive enough to other
tempted countries and/or individuals.
Tractability imposed that linear utility be used in the model. However, linear utility
takes away important dimensions of decision making that would alter the results as
follows. Considering decreasing marginal utility would have the important consequence
that getting hold of income Y is no longer as appealing as in the linear case. Put
differently, if individuals enjoy a large k, then additional consumption is less appealing.
Further, if others in society (soldiers) also enjoy a high k, it is expensive to pay them
enough to fight for you. Therefore, in the case of concave utility, a little development
might go a long way in avoiding conflict both because the benefits are no longer so highly
appreciated and the costs become higher.
Moving further away from linear utility, conflict might fail to emerge under two al-
ternative formulations of preferences. First, if preferences display some kind of satiation
threshold, above which marginal utility is zero, this will make coalition formation unin-
teresting in a rich country, where k is very large. This might help explain why conflict
did not break up in Norway following the discovery of oil, whereas a very poor country
such as Nigeria has been plagued by conflict. Second, in the case of minimal subsis-
tence requirements (Stone-Geary preferences, for example), people might be too poor to
finance an army and thus lack the means to fight. In this scenario, however, it would
have to be the case that no single individual had the means to finance a coalition nor
access to foreign funds.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposed a new approach to political economy outcomes. It starts at a more
general level than the existing work by examining the fundamentals of the economy.
Given those, it then considers all equilibria that may arise in the noncooperative game
of trying to get hold of society’s resources. The approach was applied to the natural
resource curse.
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We believe the generality of our method is a key tool in the full understanding of
political economy outcomes and what enables us to identify the elements in the nature
of a country that render inefficient outcomes unavoidable.
We seek to extend our analysis of the natural resource curse to incorporate dynamics.
We also aim to explore the enormous variety of constellations of inefficient institution
outcomes from the vantage point of the method proposed here in the hope of finding
their determinants and potential solutions.
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